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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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Achilles Corelleone

9th Cir. Case No. 12-57349

Appellant,

Originating Court Case No. 2:11-cv-04122 GW (PJW)

vs.

PEOPLE OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Appellee(s).

APPELLANT'S INFORMAL BRIEF

(attach additional sheets as necessary)

1. Jurisdiction

a. Timeliness of Appeal:

- (i) Date of entry of judgment or order
of originating court: _____
- (ii) Date of service of any motion made after judgment (other than
for fees and costs): _____
- (iii) Date of entry of order deciding motion: _____
- (iv) Date notice of appeal filed: December 21, 2012
- (v) For prisoners, date you gave notice of appeal to prison
authorities: _____

9th Cir. Case No. 12-57349

Page 2

2. What are the facts of your case?

Appellant plead nolo contendere on February 3, 2010 to two counts of oral copulation (PC 288a (b)(2)) and one count of sodomy (PC 286 (b)(2)). Petitioner received 5 years in state prison at sentencing. The Judge also imposed mandatory lifetime registration (PC 290)

The judge in the case made lifetime registration "mandatory. However, pursuant to Cal. PC 290.006 a judge must find that the acts are 1) committed out of sexual gratification or compulsion 2) the judge must state on the record the reasons for requiring lifetime registration as a sex offender. The judge made no such finding nor did he state any on the record as required by penal code 290.006 (People v. Hofsheier, 37 Cal. 4th 1185; People v Garcia, 161 Cal. App. 4th 475; People v. Taravella, 182 Cal. App. 4th 161).

Lifetime registration is also a direct consequence of a plea and, therefore is a determination for a jury because it is also an enhancement to a sentence. This cannot be left to a judge to enhance the sentence using aggravating circumstances other than past convictions or factors in aggravation admitted by the defendant. I did not admit to any aggravating circumstances, and I have never been convicted of any crimes that qualify as serious or violent under California Law. A nolo plea does not admit to aggravating circumstances.

Appellant's counsel did not interview even one witness, did not get the security videos from the motel, did not speak to the manager or owner of the motel, did not get the text messages from appellant's phone or the alleged victims phone, did not get the myspace communications between appellant and alleged victim, did not do anything at all to defend the case. Did not get the proof that appellant was at work on the days the alleged victim told the police. After appellant was sentenced his counsel stated that he'd spoken to the prosecution and that the prosecution would not have opposed the 995 motion, that he could have beaten the case and that the offenses were not registrable offenses and that I had a good case for habeas corpus.

The alleged victim had three (3) myspace pages which stated his age as 19, 19 and, 24 years old. Counsel did not get access to these or to the alleged victims phone to prove that I had broken up with him because he admitted that he was involved in a sexual relationship with an adult named 'ADAM' and,

continued next page

1 the alleged victim couldn't recall any. And, in police report
2 the alleged victim denied everything but then "smiled" and
3 made up his story. The alleged victim testified in preliminary
4 hearing that my truck had broken down and, that I had agreed
5 to have it towed to his parents' house, have his father fix
6 it, then I would pick it up after it was fixed. This alone
7 shows that I had no fear of "being found out", as this would
8 put me in direct contact with the alleged victims parents.
9 When I met the alleged victim, I met him at his parents'
10 house, stood outside by my Jeep, directly in front of his
11 parents' house. And, alleged victims older brother came out of
12 the house and spoke to the alleged victim while we were
13 talking. These facts do not show the behavior of someone who
14 is afraid of being "found out", it goes directly to the heart
15 that I did not know the victims real age and believed he was
16 18 as he had told me, and reflected on his myspace pages.

17 Had counsel been diligent and gathered evidence, called
18 witnesses, gotten the evidence from prosecutors, tested the
19 prosecution's case and, ensured the court ruled upon the 995
20 motion to dismiss, the outcome would have been different. The
21 995 motion alone would have dismissed the most serious charge.
22 Had counsel been diligent and effective I would have gone to
23 trial.

2 Cont.

1 Police confiscated my laptop computer, two cell phones,
2 my truck and, everything in it, yet not one shred of evidence
3 was ever found. The search and seizure alone was
4 unconstitutional, as it was done without a warrant.

5

2 Cont.

9th Cir. Case No. 12-57349

Page 3

3. What did you ask the originating court to do (for example, award damages, give injunctive relief, etc.)?

I do not remember, prison officials lost my documents before I was released on parole.

4. State the claim or claims you raised at the originating court.

I do not remember, my documents were lost by prison officials before I was released on parole.

I re-allege every claim that I raised in the District Court.

5. What issues are you raising on appeal? What do you think the originating court did wrong?

1. Ineffectivessistance of Counsel.
2. Penal Code 290.006 is Unconstitutional, because it allows a judge to enhance a sentence beyond the ststatutoryimum.
3. Forcing appellant to wear a GPS is Unconstitutional
- 4.Lessica's Laws and Prop. 83 are unconstitutional
5. 6th amendment violation

9th Cir. Case No. 12-57349

Page 4

6. Did you present all issues listed in #5 to the originating court?

Yes If not, why not?
Yes/No

7. What law supports these issues on appeal?

(You may, but need not, refer to cases and statutes.)

1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; Lafler v Cooper, 556 U.S. 778; Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201; Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356; Montejo v Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778; 6th Amend. U.S. Const.

2) Cal. PC 290.006 Unconstitutional; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466; Blakely v Washington, 542 U.S. 296; People v Zaidi, 55 Cal

3) Sentencing Court erred by not ruling on 995 motion to dismiss,

The court erred by not ruling on the 995 motion to dismiss the most serious charge. Appellant's counsel stated that he had spoken to the prosecution and, the prosecution would not have opposed the 995 motion.

Counsel has a duty to fully test the prosecution's case and to pursue this when he was before the court at sentencing when

continued next page

1 the prosecutors stated that they would not have opposed the
2 995 motion which would have dismissed the most serious charge,
3 nor did counsel ensure that the court ruled on the motion.

4 **INNEFFECTIVE COUNSEL:** In Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, the
5 U.S. Supreme Court held that "**Strickland**" two part test
6 governs ineffective assistance claims in the plea bargain
7 context (Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668,686; Lafler v
8 Cooper, 556 U.S. _____ 2012; Montejo v Louisiana, 556
9 U.S. 778; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201)

10 Counsel did not act with due diligence and was ineffective
11 because he did nothing to 1) gather evidence 2) ensure
12 prosecution turned over all evidence 3) speak to any witnesses
13 4) get a ruling on the motion to dismiss (995 motion). Had the
14 995 motion been ruled upon in favor of me, this would have
15 greatly changed the length of sentence, the plea negotiations,
16 and the decision to go to trial. Had the 995 motion been
17 successful I would have insisted on going to trial.
18 Furthermore, counsel stated **after** the plea had been signed and
19 I had been sentenced, that he could have beaten the case.

20 The sixth amendment right to effective counsel concerning plea
21 agreements is critical phases of litigation (Missouri v. Frye,
22 132 S. Ct. 1399; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356; Hill v
23 Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52) Counsel did not and could not give me
24 appropriate advice concerning a plea because prosecution did
25 not turn over the evidence in their possession (Brady v.
26 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83) Counsel has a duty to completely and
27 diligently test the prosecution's case (Lamar v. Graves, 326
28 F. 3d 983). Counsel did not and could not because he did not
29 have adequate evidence from the prosecution and, therefore,
30 could not give me adequate information to make a knowing and

4 cont.

1 intelligent plea (Massiah v. United States, *supra* 377 U.S.
2 201; Missouri v. Frye, *supra*, 132 S.Ct.1399; Hamilton v.
3 Alabama, 368 U.S. 52)

4 **REGISTRATION REQUIRMENTS:** The California Supreme Court and
5 courts of appeals have repeatedly held that crimes such as I
6 was convicted are not mandatory register able and by making
7 registration mandatory, violated the 14th Amendment and the
8 California Constitution.

9 In People v. Hofsheier, 37 Cal. 4th 1185, the California
10 Supreme Court stated, "therefore conclude that the statutory
11 distinction in **section 290** requiring mandatory lifetime
12 registration of all persons who, like defendant here, were
13 convicted of voluntary oral copulation with a minor of the age
14 of 16 or 17, but not of someone convicted of voluntary sexual
15 intercourse with a minor of the same age, violates the **equal**
16 **protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions.**"⁹

17 This conclusion does not preclude the Legislature from
18 requiring lifetime registration both for persons convicted of
19 voluntary oral copulation and for those convicted of voluntary
20 sexual intercourse, thus treating both groups the same."

21 Furthermore, before ordering a person to register where
22 registration is not mandatory the judge must follow a two-step
23 process (Penal Code 290.006), 1) must find that the offense
24 resulted out of sexual compulsion or gratification, 2) must
25 state on the record the reasons for the findings and the

1 reasons for requiring registration. The court stated in
2 **Hofsheier; Section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E)**, however,
3 provides that a person convicted of "any offense not included
4 specifically in [section 290]" may be required to register "if
5 the court finds ... that the person committed the offense as a
6 result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual
7 gratification." If it requires registration, the trial court
8 must "state on the record the reasons for its findings and the
9 reasons for requiring. registration." (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(E);
10 (*People v. Jones* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 220 [124 Cal. Rptr. 2d
11 10] (**Jones**), we granted review to resolve the conflict .)
12 Consequently, to implement the requirements of section 290,
13 subdivision (a)(2)(E), the trial court must engage in a two-
14 step process: (1) it must find whether the offense was
15 committed as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of
16 sexual gratification, and state the reasons for these
17 findings; and (2) it must state the reasons for requiring
18 lifetime registration as a sex offender." In my case the
19 Judge did not do this, he made registration mandatory. This
20 violates the 6th and 14th amendment. The court erred by not
21 following the required steps and, my counsel never informed me
22 that the registration was not mandatory and that the judge
23 must make such finding.

1 In People v Garcia, 161 Cal. App. 4th 475, the court held
2 that the "**Hofsheier**" doctrine applied to persons convicted
3 under Penal Code 288a (b) (2), which is what I was convicted
4 of. (see People v Luansing, 176 Cal. 4th 676; People v.
5 Ranscht, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1369; People v Taravella, 182 Cal.
6 App. 4th 161; 5-93 California Criminal Defense Practice §
7 93.04; Erwin et al., Cal. Criminal Defense Practice (2007) ch.
8 93, § 93.04; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 200
9 Punishment§187.)By making registration mandatory the court
10 violated my rights under the 14th amendment and the California
11 Constitution.

12 Counsel told me after I was sentenced that registration
13 was not mandatory in my case and that I had a good claim for a
14 habeas corpus. My counsel knew this but stayed silent and,
15 allowed the court to ignore the requirements of Penal Code
16 290.006. Counsel further stated to me that he had spoken to
17 the prosecution and that my case was a "**non-issue**" to them and
18 that they had "**bigger fish to fry**". Counsel was ineffective by
19 not gathering evidence such as security videos, text messages,
20 myspace information and by not conducting any investigation or
21 speaking to even one witness.

22 CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT: California Rules of Court, rule
23 4.114, requires that a judge rule on any motions pending,

1 prior to a readiness hearing. My counsel had filed a 995
2 motion to dismiss the most serious count, however, the judge
3 did not rule on this motion. Notably, the prosecution also did
4 not file an opposition to the 995 motion. Had the court ruled
5 on this motion and the ruling had been favorable to me, this
6 would have greatly altered any trial or plea agreements. By
7 not ruling the court erred and violated my 6th amendment
8 rights.

9 **UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE:** California Penal Code 290.006 is
10 unconstitutional because it allows a judge to order
11 registration when it is not mandatory. Registration is
12 considered a form of punishment and a direct consequence of a
13 plea; therefore it is a determination that must be made by a
14 jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cunningham v. California,
15 549 U.S. 270). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.
16 Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435, this Court held that, under the
17 Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior conviction) that
18 exposes a defendant to a sentence in excess of the relevant
19 statutory maximum must be found by a jury, not a judge, and
20 established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a
21 preponderance of the evidence. See *id.* at, 490, 120 S. Ct.
22 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435. The Court has applied the rule of
23 *Apprendi* to facts subjecting a defendant to the death penalty,

1 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153
2 L. Ed. 2d 556, facts permitting a sentence in excess of the
3 "standard range" under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act
4 (Reform Act), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-305,
5 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, and facts triggering a
6 sentence range elevation under the then-mandatory Federal
7 Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
8 243-244, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621.

9 Pursuant to California Penal Code 1170, subd (b), a
10 defendant must be provided with notice of potential
11 aggravating circumstances four days prior to a hearing.
12 (People v French, 43 Cal. 4th 36; Cal. P.C. 1170, subd (b)). I
13 was never given notice of any aggravating circumstances and
14 none were ever stated on the record. In fact at arraignment
15 the judge made notice of the fact that I had not been in
16 trouble for over twenty eight (28) years. Nor did I ever admit
17 to any aggravating factors and, my plea does not admit to any.
18 By imposing mandatory registration the court imposed a
19 sentence beyond the statutory maximum and abused its
20 discretion in doing so. By imposing mandatory registration it
21 constituted multiple punishments under Cal. Penal Codes §
22 654."Acts punishable by different provisions Effect of
23 acquittal or conviction;

1 (a) An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
2 different provisions of law shall be punished under the
3 provision that provides for the longest potential term of
4 imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be
5 punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or
6 conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for
7 the same act (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a defendant
8 sentenced pursuant to subdivision (a) shall not be granted
9 probation if any of the provisions that would otherwise apply
10 to the defendant prohibits the granting of probation." (People
11 v. Shelton, 37 Cal. 4th 759; Blakely v Washington, *supra*, 542
12 U.S. 296). In People v. Mosely, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1090, it was
13 held, "the facts supporting the imposition of the registration
14 requirement must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
15 9 U.S. 270). (Apprendi v. New Jersey, *supra*, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.
16 Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435; Blakely v. Washington, *supra*, 542
17 U.S. 296, 304-305, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403) The
18 Court in "Mosely" applied Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
19 144, and held that "Jessica's Laws" residency restrictions
20 were punitive and that its imposition by the court increases
21 the penalty and that the facts required to impose residency
22 restrictions must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
23 doubt. Penal Code 290 allows multiple punishments and leave
24 registration, which is an enhancement to a judge, not a jury.

1 The "**Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez**" rules apply to **Penal Code**
2 **290** and "**Jessica's Laws**" because it allows multiple
3 punishments under these laws. The judge did in fact enhance my
4 sentence by ordering mandatory lifetime registration beyond
5 the maximum allowed sentence without a jury finding of any
6 aggravating circumstances. (**Almendarez-Torres v. U.S.**, 523
7 U.S. 224; **Jones v. U.S.**, 526 U.S. 227, 229, 239-241, 243). I
8 did not admit to any aggravating circumstances or that any
9 acts were committed out of sexual compulsion or gratification.
10 In, **People v. Mosely**, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1090; the court stated
11 "(3) Criminal Law § 529-Punishment-Imprisonment-Sentence
12 Enhancements-Beyond Statutory Maximum-Right to Jury Trial-
13 Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. Other than the fact of a prior
14 conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
15 beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
16 jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The rights to due
17 process and trial by jury in criminal matters entitle a
18 criminal defendant to a jury determination that he or she is
19 guilty of every element of the crime with which he or she is
20 charged beyond a reasonable doubt. This jury trial entitlement
21 applies equally to elements of a crime and any enhancements to
22 the crime used to impose additional punishment. If a defendant
23 faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an
24 offense is committed under certain circumstances but not

1 others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the
2 stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily
3 follows that the defendant should not—at the moment the state
4 is put to proof of those circumstances—be deprived of
5 protections that have, until that point, unquestionably
6 attached. It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove
7 from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
8 prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
9 exposed. Such facts must be established by proof beyond a
10 reasonable doubt.”

11
12
13 JESSICA'S LAWS AND PROP. 83; are unconstitutional because they
14 put all persons convicted of a sexual related offense under a
15 blanket provision and does not take into consideration the
16 nature of the offense, a person's prior criminal history, a
17 person's dangerousness and classifies all sex offenders as
18 dangerous and high risk offenders. My **California Static Risk**
19 **Assessment** (CSRA) is a one (1), the lowest of all on the CSRA,
20 yet I am considered a high risk offender. They have an
21 overwhelming punitive effect and, affirmatively restrain the
22 right to choose a home and, the rights to live with one's
23 family; it effectuates traditional banishment under a
24 different name, interferes with the right to use and enjoy

1 property and, enjoy property near schools, parks and subjects
2 housing choices to government approval like parole, or
3 probation. Furthermore, they punish under multiple statutes
4 (Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 9 L. Ed.
5 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554), and violates the fifth amendment
6 rights of the appellant. Because the California Courts have
7 held that mandatory registration for persons convicted of the
8 crimes appellant was (People v Garcia, 161 Cal. App. 4th 475;
9 People v Luansing, 176 Cal. 4th 676; People v. Ranscht, 173
10 Cal. App. 4th 1369; People v Taravella, 182 Cal. App. 4th 161),
11 this further violates the 5th amendment. Prop. 83 and Jessica's
12 Laws, beyond a doubt, strips away my control of the right to
13 control my person and my constitutional protections and,
14 allows unconstitutional restraints as to where I might live,
15 travel, property I may own, job availability, going to church,
16 the beach, movies and causes undue prejudice. The punitive
17 effects of Jessica's Laws arise upon the imposition of the
18 lifetime registration; which is not mandatory in my case.
19 Jessica's Laws further impose unconstitutional enhancements
20 and punish under multiple statutes (Kennedy v. Mendoza-
21 Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct.
22 554). Appellant has never been convicted of any crimes that
23 are considered serious or violent. These Laws further violate
24 equal protection because other crimes such as arsonists, gang

1 member and drug dealers who are much more dangerous than
2 appellant, are not subjected to these conditions. These laws
3 do not take into account the actual crime a person was
4 convicted of, they instead are a blanket which covers all
5 persons convicted of a sex offense and even those convicted of
6 indecent exposure.

7 Appellant's rights are further violated because Cal. PC
8 3010.5 states "shall establish written guideline that
9 identifies those persons on parole subject to continuous
10 electronic monitoring. Guidelines shall include the need for
11 enhancing monitoring in comparison to other persons not
12 subjected to enhanced monitoring" Shall is mandatory language
13 not open to respondents discretion. When I asked my parole
14 agent for these written guidelines she stated that because I
15 was homeless I was high risk. She stated she was allowed to
16 make this determination and did not need to show me any
17 written guidelines. This clearly violates PC 3010.5, and gives
18 a parole agent free reign to do as they please. In Terry v.
19 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, the court held "No right is held more
20 sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
21 the right of every individual to the possession and control of
22 his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
23 others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law".

1 The court at sentencing erred and abused its discretion. Cal.
2 PC 859a (b) states; "(b) Notwithstanding Section 1191 or 1203,
3 the magistrate shall, upon the receipt of a plea of guilty or
4 nolo contendere and upon the performance of the other duties
5 of the magistrate under this section, immediately appoint a
6 time for pronouncing judgment in the superior court and refer
7 the case to the probation officer if eligible for probation,
8 as prescribed in Section 1191". (I was eligible for probation
9 but my counsel did not tell me this). The court did not refer
10 the case to a probation officer as required by **PC 859a**. Before
11 I was sentenced my counsel told me I would not be sentenced
12 that day because a probation officer had to speak to me and it
13 would be two weeks before I was sentenced. However, the judge
14 sentenced me immediately, clearly violating PC 859a and my 6th
15 and 14th amendment rights'.

16 The court, at sentencing violated my 6th and 14th amendment
17 rights by making lifetime registration "mandatory". Since my
18 offenses do not qualify as mandatory registration, they are
19 discretionary. To impose lifetime registration the judge must
20 follow a two-step process he must find **1)** that the offense was
21 committed out of sexual gratification or compulsion and, **2)**
22 requires that he must state on the record the reasons for the
23 findings requiring registration. (**PC 290.006**). Furthermore,

1 the courts have held that the imposition of registration
2 increases the penalty. People v. Mosley, 188 Cal. App. 4th
3 1090, "Imposing a residency restriction through discretionary
4 sex offender registration as part of the sentencing on the
5 underlying offense increases the penalty for that offense
6 beyond the statutory maximum. Accordingly, the facts
7 supporting the imposition of the registration requirement must
8 be found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt" (Blakely v.
9 Washington, (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 124 S. Ct.
10 2531]; Cunningham v. California, (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.
11 Ed. 2d 856, 127 S. Ct. 856]; (Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
12 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, "Court held that, under
13 the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior conviction)
14 that exposes a defendant to a sentence in excess of the
15 relevant statutory maximum must be found by a jury, not a
16 judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely
17 by a preponderance of the evidence". See id. at, 490, 120 S.
18 Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435). PC 290.006 is unconstitutional
19 because it allows a judge to impose lifetime registration,
20 increasing the penalty for an offense. These are facts that
21 must be found by a jury and defendant allowed to contest.

22
23
4 cont.

9th Cir. Case No. 12-57349

Page 5

8. Do you have any other cases pending in this court?
If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

yes, Case No: 12-57325

9. Have you filed any previous cases which have been decided by this court?
If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

yes but don't know Case Numbers, all the documents
I had were lost by prison officials before I was released
on parole

10. For prisoners, did you exhaust all administrative remedies for each claim
prior to filing your complaint in the district court?

yes.

Achilles Corelleone

Name

C/o Panama Hotel, Rm 341

403 E. 5th Street

Los Angeles, CA 90013

Address

Achilles Corelleone

Signature

March 7, 2013

Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name: Corellesone v. People of California9th Cir. Case No.: 12-57349

IMPORTANT: You must send a copy of ALL documents filed with the Court and any attachments to counsel for ALL parties in this case. You must attach a copy of the certificate of service to each of the copies and the original you file with the Court. Please fill in the title of the document you are filing. Please list the names and addresses of the parties who were sent a copy of your document and the dates on which they were served. Be sure to sign the statement below.

I certify that a copy of the Appellants Informal Brief
(title of document you are filing)
and any attachments was served, either in person or by mail, on the persons listed below.

Achilles Corellesone

Signature

Notary NOT required

<u>Name</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Date Served</u>
Attorney General	300 S. Spring St. Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013	March 7, 2013

9th Cir. Case No. 12-57349

Page 5

8. Do you have any other cases pending in this court?
If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

yes, case number 12-57325

9. Have you filed any previous cases which have been decided by this court?
If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

Yes but I do not remember the numbers, prison officials lost my legal documents before I was released on parole.

10. For prisoners, did you exhaust all administrative remedies for each claim prior to filing your complaint in the district court?

yes

Achilles Corelleone

Name


403 E. 5th St., Room 341

Los Angeles, CA 90013

Address

March 7, 2013

Date


Signature

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name: Corelleone v. People of Cal., CDCR

9th Cir. Case No.: 12-57325

IMPORTANT: You must send a copy of ALL documents filed with the Court and any attachments to counsel for ALL parties in this case. You must attach a copy of the certificate of service to each of the copies and the original you file with the Court. Please fill in the title of the document you are filing. Please list the names and addresses of the parties who were sent a copy of your document and the dates on which they were served. Be sure to sign the statement below.

I certify that a copy of the Informal Brief
(title of document you are filing)
and any attachments was served, either in person or by mail, on the persons listed below.

Achilles Corelleone

Signature

Notary NOT required

<u>Name</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Date Served</u>
Attorney General	300 S. Spring St. Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013	march. 7, 2013